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The United States Supreme Court has recently decided a pair of
cases involving two core issues relating to state taxation of interstate
commerce. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota' addressed the question when
does a state have sufficient contact or nexus with an interstate
business carried on within its borders to justify a tax? Insufficient
nexus with the taxpayer means the state has no power to tax.
Sufficient nexus means the state has power to tax and the focus shifts
from whether the state may tax to what it may tax. The unitary
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967,
University of Iowa; L L.M. (Taxation) 1969, Georgetown University. The author
thanks his colleague Professor Mike Curtis for helpful comments on a draft.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
1993] STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 683
business principle has played a central role in determining the scope
of state taxation of interstate commerce,2 and in Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Director, Division of Taxation,3 New Jersey launched a frontal
assault on that principle. Both cases are significant not merely
because they involved fundamental issues concerning state taxation of
interstate commerce, but because Quill broke new ground by
diminishing due process constraints on state taxation, while Allied-
Signal reaffirmed and perhaps expanded the unitary business concept.
This article begins with an examination of Quill and the nexus
requirement. It argues that while the pre-Quill approach needed
revision, Quill is a short-sighted, poorly reasoned decision likely to
create more problems than it solves. Next, Allied-Signal and the
unitary business principle are examined. This examination discloses
that while the Court implicitly recognized the defects in the prior law,
the Allied-Signal decision is unable to cure these defects. In sum,
neither decision does anything to improve the jurisprudence of this
"impoverished territory."4 The purpose of the article is to suggest that
if genuine progress is to be made, the Court must disentangle due
process and commerce clause constraints on state taxation of
interstate commerce. One way to achieve this is to build on the Quill
notion that due process constraints be reduced, and primary reliance
be placed on the commerce clause as a means of curbing excessive
state taxation of interstate commerce.
2. Nexus and the unitary business principle are related but distinct concepts. The
nexus requirement goes to whether the taxing state has a sufficient connection
with either the taxpayer, or the activity or value being taxed. Nexus may exist
with respect to a taxpayer (for example, because the taxpayer is physically
present within the taxing state), but not with respect to a particular activity or
value the state seeks to tax. Thus, if a taxpayer is engaged in an interstate
business partly conducted within state A, and is physically present in state A,
there is a nexus between state A and the taxpayer, and it may properly impose a
tax. The unitary business principle may then be used to determine what kind of
tax state A can impose. It would allow state A to tax a portion of all income
derived from unitary business activities, regardless of where they occur, but
would not support a tax on other income realized by the taxpayer. For a tax on
such income to be allowed, it must be connected with state A in some other way.
Essentially, the unitary business principle provides a means for determining
whether the subject matter of a tax, income in the case of an income tax, meets
the nexus requirement. It may serve a similar role with respect to other types of
taxes such as a gross receipts tax or a capital stock tax. For a fuller explanation
see text, following note 84 infra.
3. 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
4. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265
(1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia the commerce clause
decisions limiting state taxation of interstate commerce have "made no sense."
Id. at 260. He is not the first Justice to have expressed this view. See
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457
(1959)(Justice Clark, writing for the Court, characterized the decisions in this
area as a "tangled underbrush").
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I. QUILL AND THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Quill was a Delaware corporation selling office equipment and sup-
plies to customers in North Dakota. It had no outlets, sales represent-
atives, or employees in North Dakota. It owned no property located
within the state except for "a few floppy diskettes"5 containing a com-
puter software program which Quill had licensed to some of its North
Dakota customers, enabling them to check Quill's current prices and
to place orders directly.6 Although the Court characterized its owner-
ship of tangible property in the state as "either insignificant or non-
existent,"7 Quill was the sixth largest seller of office supplies in North
Dakota with about 3,000 customers and annual sales of one million
dollars. It solicited orders through catalogs, flyers, advertisements in
national periodicals, and telephone calls. Delivery to North Dakota
customers was by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations.
Like most states, North Dakota imposes a sales tax on retail sales
within the state and a complementary use tax which applies at the
same rate as the sales tax to goods purchased outside the state for use
within the state.8 Retailers are required to collect either a sales or a
use tax and remit it to the state. Until 1987 Quill was not required to
collect the tax because it was not a "retailer" under the North Dakota
statute. The statutory definition of "retailer" was then changed to in-
clude an out-of-state seller like Quill who regularly solicits customers
within the state.9 Regular solicitation means three or more advertise-
ments during a year.10 Thus, since 1987, Quill and other mail-order
companies advertising within the state were required to collect a use
tax on sales to North Dakota residents, even if they had no property or
personnel within the state.
The North Dakota statute was plainly at odds with National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,11 which held a similar Illinois
statute violative of both the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the commerce clause. Relying on Bellas Hess, Quill
declined to comply with North Dakota's use tax collection statute. In
an enforcement action brought by the state, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that Bellas Hess had lost its authority due to
5. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914, n.8 (1992).
6. Id. at 1907 n.1.
7. Id. at 1907.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991). The state sales tax rate in North Da-
kota is 5%. State sales tax rates vary from a low of 3% in Colorado and Wyoming,
to a high of 7% in Rhode Island. Only five states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire and Oregon) have no sales tax. See 53 CCH STATE TAX REVIEW
No. 29 at 20-21 (1992).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5 7-4 0.2 -01( 6 )(Supp. 1991).
10. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988).
11. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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economic and legal change, and upheld the statute.12 Noting that
"contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the
same result were the issue to arise for the first time today,"Is the
United States Supreme Court applied the Bellas Hess rule, reversed
the North Dakota Supreme Court decision, and struck down the
North Dakota statute. Despite Quill's very substantial sales to North
Dakota residents the nexus requirement of the commerce clause was
not satisfied.14
Before turning to an analysis of the Quill decision, it will be help-
ful to place both Quill and Bellas Hess in proper perspective.
A. Bellas Hess in Perspective
Prior to its 1967 Bellas Hess decision, the Supreme Court had con-
sidered the power of a state to impose the duty to collect a use tax on
interstate transactions in a variety of circumstances. The cases typi-
cally involved claims that the use tax collection statute violated both
the due process clause and the commerce clause. As the Supreme
Court noted in Bellas Hess, "These two claims are closely related."15
The due process clause provides that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. At the threshold, it requires a
nexus between the taxing state and the taxpayer. In determining
whether a sufficient nexus or connection exists the Court has stated:
"The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return."16 In addition, the due process
clause requires that the tax be measured in a way that is rationally
related to the nexus between the taxpayer and the taxing state. In
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,'7 the Court described the two-
prong test of the due process clause as applied to a state income tax:
The Due Process Clause places two restrictions on a State's power to tax in-
come generated by the activities of an interstate business. First, no tax may be
imposed, unless there is some minimal connection between those activities
and the taxing State.... Second, the income attributed to the State for tax
purposes must be rationally related to "values connected with the taxing
state."'
8
The commerce clause grants Congress exclusive power to regulate
12. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 209 (1991).
13. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992).
14. Id. at 1914.
15. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
16. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
17. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
18. Id at 272 (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325 (1968)). In the context of a use tax the due process clause will generally be
satisfied if the first condition is met. This is because a use tax is measured by the
sale price (value) of property used within the taxing state, and this measurement
automatically meets the second condition. Id.
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commerce among the several states. Under the so-called negative or
dormant commerce clause, state regulation which unduly burdens in-
terstate commerce may be held invalid as inconsistent with the exclu-
sive grant of regulatory authority to Congress.19 Prior to the Supreme
Court's 1977 decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,20 the
commerce clause added three conditions to those of the due process
clause. First, interstate commerce was immune from direct taxation
by the states.2 ' Second, taxes which discriminated against interstate
commerce were invalid.22 Third, the states could not subject inter-
state commerce to multiple or cumulative taxation.23 Complete Auto
abandoned the tax immunity rule with its distinction between direct
and indirect taxation of interstate commerce, and set out a four-prong
test under which a tax will be sustained against a commerce clause
challenge if it: "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing state, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State."24 Although the Complete Auto test does not
include multiple burdens terminology, taxes that are not apportioned
or that discriminate violate the commerce clause because of the multi-
ple or undue burdens they cast on interstate commerce.
The relationship between the due process and commerce clauses,
as applied to state taxation of interstate commerce, always has been
somewhat murky.25 Even before Complete Auto and its explicit adop-
tion of a nexus test under the commerce clause, it was apparent that a
good deal of overlap existed. For example, if a taxpayer is conducting
an interstate business in states A and B, but has no connection with
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 325-26 (1978).
20. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
21. See Spector Motor Serv. Inc., v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), overruled by Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
22. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977)("The prohi-
bition against discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexora-
bly from the basic purpose of the [C]ommerce [Clause.")
23. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). For a fuller
explanation of the historical development of these requirements under the com-
merce clause see, David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Quiet
Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing? 38 TAX L. REV. 127, 129-146 (1982).
24. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
25. Two noted authorities on state and local taxation have stated-
It is interesting to note the similarly of the conception of extraterritori-
ality as the basis for invalidating taxes under the Due Process Clause
and the requirement of apportionment as the prerequisite of validation
under the Commerce Clause. Both simmer down to essentially the same
result, namely, that a State can tax only what is "justly attributable" to
it. Under both clauses, the judgment of what is "justly attributable" to a
State is made by the Court.
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
830, n.16 (5th ed. 1988). Extraterritorial taxation occurs when a state imposes a
tax without an appropriate nexus.
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state C, a tax imposed by state C would violate the nexus requirement
of the due process clause; and, since any tax imposed by state C could
also be imposed by states A or B, which do have a nexus with the
taxpayer, the state C tax would also violate the multiple burdens doc-
trine of the commerce clause. Furthermore, although states A and B
have a nexus with the taxpayer, if either imposed an unapportioned
tax on an item subject to taxation by both, such a tax likely would
violate both clauses. For instance, if state A imposed an income tax on
all income derived from interstate activities conducted in both states,
the risk of multiple taxation which would materialize if state B taxed
all or a portion of the same income would mean state A's tax violates
the multiple burdens doctrine of the commerce clause. The tax might
also be viewed as unconstitutional under the second prong of the due
process test.26 The fact that state A has a nexus with a taxpayer does
not necessarily mean a tax on all income realized by the taxpayer is
rationally related to the nexus.
In light of this overlap, perhaps it is not surprising that the Court,
in the words of its Quill opinion, has "not always been precise in dis-
tinguishing between.., the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause."27 Bellas Hess was one of many cases in which the Court
blended due process and commerce clause analysis. There the Court
stated:
[The test whether a particular state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive
authority of Congress to regulate trade between the States, and the test for a
26. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
27. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992). The Court's failure to
deal separately with due process and commerce clause concerns is not new. In
1944 Justice Rutledge observed,
"Due Process" and "[C]ommerce [Clause" conceptions are not always
sharply separable.... To some extent they overlap. If there is a want of
due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the tax
imposes on the commerce among the states becomes "undue." But,
though overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be
more than sufficient factual connections, with economic and legal ef-
fects, between the transaction and the taxing state to sustain the tax as
against due process objections. Yet it may fall because of its burdening
effect upon the commerce. And, although the two notions cannot always
be separated, clarity of consideration and of decision would be promoted
if the two issues are approached, where they are presented, at least ten-
tatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353
(1944)(Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also, David F.
Shores, State Taxation of Gross Receipts and the Negative Commerce Clause, 54
Mo. L. REv. 555, 563 (1989)("Complete Auto and other recent decisions.., fused
due process and commerce clause concerns. That is unfortunate. Minimally, sep-
arating the analysis of whether a state has power to tax under the due process
clause, from the analysis of whether a tax has imposed an undue burden on inter-
state commerce, would help clarify why the court concluded a state tax either
was or was not unconstitutional. Beyond that, it might contribute to the Court's
insights and have a positive effect on its conclusions.")
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State's compliance with the requirements of due process in this area are simi-
lar. As to the former, the Court has held that "State taxation falling on inter-
state commerce ... can only be justified as designed to make such commerce
bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it en-
joys." And in determining whether a state tax falls within the confines of the
Due Process Clause, the Court has said that the "simple but controlling ques-
tion is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return." The
same principles have been held applicable in determining the power of a State
to impose the burdens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales. 2 8
Under the principles described in Bellas Hess, the Court in prior
cases had upheld the power of a state to impose a use tax collection
duty upon an out-of-state seller where sales were arranged by the
seller's agents within the taxing state;2 9 where an out-of-state mail-
order seller maintained local retail stores within the taxing state;30
and where the out-of-state seller solicited orders within the taxing
state through independent wholesalers and jobbers.31 On the other
hand, in Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland,32 the Court did not allow
Maryland to impose a use tax collection obligation upon a Delaware
seller who had no retail outlets or sales solicitors in Maryland. The
seller advertised in Maryland by newspaper, radio, and mailing circu-
lars. It made sales to Maryland customers at its Delaware store and
made deliveries into Maryland with its own trucks and drivers. Ob-
serving that there was a "wide gulf" between continuous local solicita-
tion through traveling sales agents and the transportation of goods
sold in Delaware to Maryland customers with no solicitation other
than general advertising, the Court concluded that there was "no inva-
sion or exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland." 33 The
seller's contact with Maryland, the Court held, did not meet the "time-
honored concept: that due process requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax."34 Since the Maryland statute violated the
due process clause, the Court declined to considered the taxpayer's
commerce clause claim.
As already noted, the Court was less explicit as to the basis for its
holding in Bellas Hess where, relying on Miller Brothers, it observed
that "the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use
tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with
28. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)(ci-
tations omitted).
29. Felt and Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 68 (1939); General Trading Co. v.
Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944).
30. Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 365 (1941); Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward, 312 U.S. 373, 375 (1941).
31. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson 362 U.S. 207, 213 (1960).
32. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 344-45.
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customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States
mail."35 Since Bellas Hess only mailed catalogs and advertising flyers
to residents of the taxing state and made deliveries by common carrier
or the mail, the Court found its contact to be even less than that in-
volved in Miller Brothers. After reviewing prior cases in which the
limiting principles of both the due process and commerce clauses had
been applied, the Court concluded:
[lt is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively inter-
state in character than the mail order transactions here involved. And if the
power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National [Bellas Hess] were
upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate busi-
ness would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such
burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality,
every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Na-
tion with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of
tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record keeping re-
quirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of
complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to im-
pose "a fair share of the cost of the local government."
The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national econ-
omy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitu-
tion, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and
control.3 6
A vigorous dissent by Justice Fortas, with whom Justices Black
and Douglas joined, argued that regular solicitation of orders through
the mail evidences just the kind of regular and continuous exploita-
tion of the consumer market found lacking in Miller Brothers. As to
the Court's concern that use tax obligations might entangle mail order
sellers in a welter of complicated administrative and record keeping
requirements, the dissent felt this concern "vastly underestimates the
skill of contemporary man and his machines." 37
In a subsequent case, the Court declined to apply the Bellas Hess
rule to mail order sales by National Geographic Society to customers
in California. In National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization, although the Society's contacts with its California cus-
tomers were exclusively by mail or common carrier, the Society did
maintain two offices in California which performed no duties in con-
nection with the sales.38 The Court limited Bellas Hess to interstate
sellers with no physical presence within the taxing state and who only
communicate with customers by mail or common carrier as part of an
interstate business. Therefore the Society's California offices pro-
vided a sufficient nexus for imposition of a use tax collection duty
even though the offices were not involved with the taxed sales. Na-
35. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
36. Id. at 759-60 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id at 766 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
38. 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977).
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tional Geographic made clear that the nexus requirement of Bellas
Hess does not apply on a transactional basis. That is, so long as the
taxpayer is physically present within the state, no connection between
the sales transaction triggering the use tax collection liability and the
taxing state, whether delivered by mail or common carrier, is
required.
B. The Pre-Quill Climate
Economic and legal changes since Bellas Hess caused many to call
for its overruling.39 The main criticism, based on economic grounds,
was that whatever may have been the case when Bellas Hess was de-
cided, technological developments such as the use of toll-free tele-
phone lines, fax orders, computer "catalogs", and 24-hour home
shopping television channels, have greatly facilitated mail-order sales
making the physical presence test of Bellas Hess obsolete. Since Bellas
Hess was decided, mail-order sales have skyrocketed from an esti-
mated $2.4 billion in 1967 to $183 billion in 1989.40
Concerning legal changes, language in the Bellas Hess opinion41
suggested the Court was influenced by the tax immunity doctrine that
banned direct state taxation of interstate transactions which was re-
jected by it in Complete Auto. Thus, it was arguable that the change of
law represented by Complete Auto undercut the Bellas Hess holding.
Indeed, this was the principal ground upon which Justice White based
his opinion dissenting from that part of the Quill decision which up-
held the commerce clause branch of Bellas Hess.42 He stated: "[w]hat
we disavowed in Complete Auto was not just the 'formal distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" taxes on interstate commerce,' but
also the whole notion underlying the Bellas Hess physical presence
rule that 'interstate commerce is immune from state taxation.' "4s
39. See Paul J. Hartman, Collection of Use Tax On Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39
VAND. L. REV. 993, 1006 (1986); Sandra B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due
Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 265; See also, David F. Shores, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Quiet Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing,
38 TAX LAW REV. 127, 149-150 (1982)(Criticizing Standard Pressed Steel Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), which applied a similar nexus re-
quirement for purposes of a gross receipts tax.)
40. See North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 209 (1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 1904
(1992).
41. "[I]t is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively inter-
state in character than the mail-order transactions here involved." National Bel-
las Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
42. See text following note 53 infra for a discussion of the commerce clause aspect of
Quill.
43. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1917 (1992). Justice White also ar-
gued that the National Geographic Court's rejection of a transactional nexus re-
quirement made clear its reliance on "a due process-type minimum contacts
analysis that examined whether a link existed between the seller and the State
[Vol. 72:682
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It was also urged that Congress overrule Bellas Hess.44 Such legis-
lative action would have raised the sticky question whether Bellas
Hess was grounded on the due process clause or the commerce clause.
If it was a commerce clause decision it was clearly subject to revision
by Congress. This follows logically from the negative commerce
clause doctrine which holds that Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce implies a limitation on state power to regulate or
otherwise burden commerce that must be explicated by the Court
only so long as Congress remains silent.45 If Bellas Hess was based on
the due process clause, it was by no means clear that Congress had
power to alter it.46 However, respected commentators had argued that
Congress could overrule due process decisions limiting state taxing
power. The theory was that since the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not apply to Congress, and under the com-
merce clause Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce, it could exercise its commerce clause authority to displace
due process or equal protection restraints on state taxation of inter-
state commerce.47 This theory has been put to rest by the Quill deci-
sion where the Court stated: "[W]hile Congress has plenary power to
regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state ac-
tions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the
power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause." 48 After
wholly apart from the seller's in-state transaction that was being taxed." Thus,
according to Justice White, pre-Complete Auto decisions required a transactional
nexus because without such a nexus the tax could not be viewed as falling on a
local aspect of an interstate transaction, and under the tax immunity rule a trans-
action which was exclusively interstate could not be taxbd at all. The abandon-
ment of a transactional nexus requirement in National Geographic was a logical
outgrowth of Complete Auto's rejection of the tax immunity rule, and suggested
that Bellas Hess with its search for a local connection evidenced by physical pres-
ence within the taxing state was no longer sound. Id at 1917-18.
44. See Hartman supra note 39 at 1015.
45. For a fuller explanation see TRIBE, supra note 19, at 325-26. See also HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 25, at 326 ('The power of Congress to lift the Commerce Clause
barriers to State taxation is unquestioned and, indeed, that power is well estab-
lished by decisions of the Supreme Court.")
46. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 350, n.14 (1982)(Jus-
tice O'Connor, dissenting, stated: "[Ilt has long been established that Congress
generally has the power to 'overrule' a decision of this Court invalidating state
legislation on Commerce Clause grounds. By contrast, Congress generally cannot
waive a ruling of this Court decided under the Due Process Clause."(citations
omitted).
47. See, William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388
(1983)("[i]n appropriate circumstances, Congress should be able to authorize the
states to enact legislation that, in the absence of congressional consent, would run
afoul of the due process or equal protection clauses of the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment."); See also, Hartman supra note 39 at 1022-28.
48. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992)(citations omitted).
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Quill there is a clear need for distinguishing restraints on state taxing
power under the due process clause from restrains under the com-
merce clause, since only the latter can be modified by congressional
action.
C. The Quill Decision
The Court began its analysis by observing that the Bellas Hess deci-
sion relied on both the due process clause and the commerce clause.
Thus, under Bellas Hess the North Dakota statute violated both consti-
tutional provisions. However, it pointed out that since the clauses re-
flect different constitutional concerns, they impose distinct limits on
the taxing power of the states. While a state may have authority to
tax under the due process clause, the imposition of a tax may nonethe-
less violate the commerce clause.
Turning to the due process limitation, the Court noted that "Our
due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years
since Bellas Hess, particularly in the area of judicial jurisdiction."4 9 In
that context the primary concern of the due process clause is that a
defendant have sufficient contact with a jurisdiction in which it is sub-
ject to suit, so that the maintenance of a suit within that jurisdiction
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The recent cases have abandoned a formalistic, Bellas Hess-like ap-
proach that focused on the defendant's physical presence within a
state, in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether the defendant's
contacts with the state made it reasonable to require it to defend a suit
filed there. Quoting from its earlier decision in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,O the Court stated that "[s]o long as a commercial actor's
efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State,
we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there."51
Similar reasoning, the Court concluded, justifies the imposition of
a use tax collection duty on an out-of-state mail-order house engaged
in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within the state.
Since Quill purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota resi-
dents, those activities were of sufficient magnitude to satisfy due pro-
cess requirements and the use tax which Quill was obligated to collect
was related to benefits it received by virtue of making sales within the
state; the Court concluded that the North Dakota statute did not vio-
late the due process clause. To the extent that prior decisions such as
Bellas Hess indicated a physical presence within the state was neces-
sary to satisfy due process requirements for imposition of a use tax
49. Id. at 1910.
50. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
51. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1992)(citations omitted).
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collection duty, those decisions were expressly overruled.52
This much of the Quill opinion adopts the view of the dissenting
justices in Bellas Hess that regular solicitation of orders through the
mail, or by other means not involving physical contact, demonstrates
regular exploitation of a consumer market within the taxing state.
This provides a sufficient nexus to sustain a use tax collection duty.
Despite the Court's claim that this view gained support from post-Bel-
las Hess cases involving judicial jurisdiction, it seems clear that it had
ample support in pre-Bellas Hess cases involving jurisdiction to tax.
As early as 1940 the Court announced that the critical inquiry in deter-
mining whether sufficient nexus exists for taxation purposes is
"whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."s3
It can hardly be disputed that anyone who substantially benefits from
a consumer market, which has been nurtured by the state's infrastruc-
ture, can be asked for some return. It seems likely the Bellas Hess
Court was blind to this fact because the tax immunity doctrine pre-
cluded state taxation of interstate commerce. As the Bellas Hess
Court observed,54 it is hard to imagine a transaction more exclusively
interstate in character than a mail-order transaction crossing state
lines. Since purely interstate transactions were immune from state
taxation, it made some sense to buttress the immunity with due pro-
cess reasoning, even though the tax immunity rule originated in the
commerce clause. The faulty and unpersuasive due process reasoning
of Bellas Hess, finally rejected in Quill, can thus be attributed to the
Court's penchant for blending due process and commerce clause con-
siderations in state taxation cases.
As delineated in Quill, the minimum contact necessary to satisfy
due process for taxation purposes will exist whenever a commercial
activity is purposefully directed at residents of a taxing state. Regular
solicitations within the state by any means will presumably suffice.
Turning to the commerce clause aspects of the case, the Quill
Court reiterated Complete Auto's four-prong test,5 5 and acknowledged
that Complete Auto repudiated prior decisions which had embraced
the tax immunity rule. Conceding that Bellas Hess was decided in
1967 when the immunity rule was enjoying its "latest rally,"56 the
Court nonetheless rejected the state's argument that Bellas Hess was
an offshoot of the tax immunity rule and should join it in the dustbin
of history. Instead, the Court concluded that the physical presence
test "of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce
52. Id at 1911.
53. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
54. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759 (1967).
55. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992). For a statement of the
four-prong test see text accompanying note 22 supra.
56. Id.
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Clause,"57
The Court faced two obstacles in developing a rationale to support
its commerce clause conclusion. First, and most importantly, Com-
plete Auto rejected formalistic tests of prior commerce clause deci-
sions and instead looked to practical realities5 8 Bellas Hess ignored
the practical reality that an out-of-state seller could benefit from a
retail market within the taxing state while not being present there.
So its physical presence test is formalistic and inconsistent with Com-
plete Auto. Second, as the Court acknowledged,59 Bellas Hess was a
nexus case. No prior decision had established, or even suggested, a
distinction between the nexus requirements of the due process and
commerce clauses. How then could the Court reconcile its repudiation
of the due process branch of Bellas Hess with its retention of the com-
merce clause branch of that case?
The Court attempted to clear the first hurdle by asserting that
"three weeks after Complete Auto was handed down, [in National Geo-
graphic] ... we affirmed the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess."60 In
fact, the National Geographic Court did no such thing. Instead, it
merely observed that in light of the traditional distinction between
those taxpayers who were physically present in the taxing state and
those who were not, the Bellas Hess holding which dealt only with the
latter group was irrelevant to the determination of whether the for-
mer group met the nexus requirement. 61 The Court held that the So-
ciety met the nexus requirement by virtue of its physical presence
within the state. Contrary to the suggestion of the Quill Court the
National Geographic Court had no reason to consider whether the So-
ciety would have met the nexus requirement if it was not physically
present within the state, and thus had no reason to question the con-
tinuing vitality of Bellas Hess.
Concerning the relationship between the nexus requirements of
the due process clause and the commerce clause, the Court observed
that "[t]he two standards are animated by different constitutional con-
cerns and policies," 62 and therefore are not equivalent. Due process is
primarily concerned with the fundamental fairness of government ac-
tivity and thus asks "[w]hether an individual's connections with a
57. Id at 1914.
58. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)(citations
omitted), the Court stated: "In several recent cases [including Complete Auto],
this Court... has attempted to clarify the apparently conflicting precedents it has
spawned. In an endeavor to establish a consistent and rational method of inquiry,
we have examined the practical effect of a challenged tax ......
59. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992).
60. Id. at 1912.
61. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559
(1977).
62. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913 (1992).
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State are substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of
power over him."63 The central concern of the commerce clause is not
fair treatment for an individual taxpayer but "structural concerns
about the effects of state regulation on the national economy.... Ac-
cordingly, ... a corporation may have the 'minimum contacts' with a
taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the
'substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce
Clause."64
While it has been long recognized that the due process and com-
merce clauses are animated by different concerns, the Court did not
make it clear why those different concerns call for different nexus
standards. The different concerns explain why the commerce clause
but not the due process clause requires, in addition to nexus, that a tax
be fairly apportioned and not discriminate against interstate com-
merce. These additional requirements are obviously aimed at prevent-
ing states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. But
it remains a mystery why the undue burdens doctrine mandates a
nexus test for the commerce clause unlike that of the due process
clause. Indeed, if as Complete Auto suggests, economic realities are to
govern, the Court's due process holding that commercial activity pur-
posefully directed at residents of the taxing state demonstrates that
the state has given something for which it can ask return, implies that
a tax imposed under such circumstances cannot automatically be
viewed as an undue burden.
Significantly, the Court did not attempt to reconcile its holding in
Quill with the fundamental principle of Complete Auto that a "tax
should be judged by its economic effects."65 The Court implicitly ac-
knowledged that the Bellas Hess rule which allows out-of-state sellers
to regularly exploit a consumer market within the taxing state with-
out paying tax, so long as it has neither personnel nor property within
the state, is a formalistic rule. However, it observed that "not all for-
malism is alike."66 The formalism of decisions under the tax immu-
nity rule repudiated in Complete Auto focused on the words of the
taxing statute. A direct tax on interstate commerce held invalid under
the tax immunity rule could be recast by the legislature and validated
through a mere change in words.67 The Court concluded that such
63. Id.
64. Id at 1913-14 (citations omitted).
65. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). The underlying
philosophy of the Complete Auto decision and its adoption of the four-prong com-
merce clause test was that under the tax immunity rule economically identical
activities were treated differently for tax purposes. The four-prong test was in-
tended to emphasize economic substance rather than formalities in determining
the constitutionality of a tax. Id. at 288.
66. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914 (1992).
67. Cf Railway Express Agency v. Virginia [Railway Express I], 347 U.S. 359
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verbal formalism served no legitimate commerce clause propose. 68
However, "the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity
that is free from interstate taxation,"69 under the bright-line rule of
Bellas Hess, serves the commerce clause by avoiding the need for a
case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by use taxes
and reducing litigation concerning those taxes.70 Finally, the Court
stated, "a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also en-
courages settled expectations," 71 and thus facilitates growth in the
mail-order industry.
The problem with the Court's defense of the Bellas Hess brand of
formalism is that it applies equally to other brands of formalism, in-
cluding that engendered by the tax immunity rule. Under that rule
interstate commerce was free of direct state taxation. Similarly,
under the bright-line test of Bellas Hess, interstate commerce involv-
ing no physical presence within a state is free of state taxation. As did
the tax immunity rule, the physical presence test avoids the need for
determining the economic effect of a tax on a case-by-case basis by
focusing on a formality having little or nothing to do with whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return. Both can be said
to reduce, but not eliminate, the need for litigation. Just as the tax
immunity rule called for a case-by-case determination of what consti-
tutes a direct verses an indirect tax, the bright-line test of Bellas Hess
calls for a case-by-case determination of what constitutes physical
presence within the taxing state. Perhaps the physical presence test is
easier to apply than the direct-indirect test and is therefore more de-
sirable. However, the basic shortcoming of each test is the same.
Under each test economically similar activities may be treated differ-
ently depending on the outcome of a formalistic test. So far as growth
in the mail-order industry is concerned, it seems likely that growth
was attributable to technological change and the tax exemption pro-
vided by Bellas Hess, rather than the predictability of its bright-line
rule.72
(1954)(tax on the privilege of conducting an interstate business within the state
measured by gross receipts attributable to activities within the state held invalid),
with Railway Express Agency v. Virginia [Railway Express II], 358 U.S. 434
(1959) (tax on the going concern value of intangible property used in an interstate
business conducted within the state and measured by gross receipts attributable
to in-state activities valid).
68. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914 (1992).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1915.
71. Id.
72. It has been suggested that the industry specific reasons provided by the Court for
retaining the Bellas Hess physical presence test may indicate the Court will take a
different approach with taxpayers outside the mail-order industry. Walter Hel-
lerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax Imposed On Mail-Order Sellers...
for Now, 77 J. OF TAXATION 120, 124 (1992). As the author recognized, the devel-
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Finally, the Court reiterated that "we have, in our decisions, fre-
quently relied on the Bellas Hess rule in the last twenty-five years." 73
However, the cases to which the Court referred did not rely on Bellas
Hess. The only case in which Bellas Hess was given significant consid-
eration was National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equal-
ization.74 As discussed above, that case did not rely on Bellas Hess for
its holding but distinguished it as irrelevant to determining whether a
taxpayer physically present within the taxing state can be compelled
to collect a use tax. In all of the other cases, Bellas Hess was merely
cited without significant discussion.75
The Court did give two legitimate reasons for upholding Bellas
Hess. First, the Court observed in a footnote76 that within the United
States there are some 6,000-plus state and local taxing jurisdictions
which impose sales and use taxes. Compliance with the various rates
of tax, allowable exemptions, and administrative and record-keeping
requirements could entangle a national mail-order house in a virtual
welter of obligations. Although this concern looks to the economic
effects of the tax and is thus consistent with the philosophy of Com-
plete Auto, it is not encompassed within the four-prong Complete Auto
test. This concern is answered by the fact that Congress can limit
state taxing power to avoid such excessive entanglement problems.
Indeed, as the Court observed,77 there is precedent for such congres-
sional action.78
Furthermore, the Court has never evaluated taxes under the com-
merce clause through a balancing process in which the burden of en-
tanglement with state and local taxing jurisdictions is compared with
the jurisdictions' need for revenue. That sort of balancing process, ap-
propriate enough for the legislature, has little to commend it as a judi-
cially applied test for determining the validity of taxes under the
commerce clause. As experience with the fourth prong of the Com-
plete Auto test demonstrates,79 the Court has had little success in ap-
opment of different constitutional rules for different industries has little to com-
mend it. It seems unlikely the Court will adopt such an approach.
73. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1915-16 (1992).
74. 430 U.S. 551 (1977). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
75. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992).
76. Id at 1913 n.6.
77. Id at 1915 n.5.
78. When the Court decided in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), that so long as the taxpayer has an adequate nexus with
the taxing state, "net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to state taxation," Id. at 452, Congress promptly responded
with Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381). It provides that
no state shall impose a net income tax on any person whose only activity within
the state consists of the solicitation of orders which are approved outside the state
and filled outside the state.
79. The fourth prong requires that a tax be fairly related to services provided by the
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plying such open-ended tests in the context of state and local taxation.
The second legitimate but unpersuasive reason offered by the
Court in support of its Quill holding was grounded on principles of
stare decisis. Standing by what has previously been decided in order
to protect reliance interests, may be sound so long as what has been
decided in a prior case fits rationally within the pattern of decisional
law created by subsequent cases. However, as Justice White correctly
noted in his dissenting opinion, after Complete Auto and its rejection
of the tax immunity rule, "the illogic of retaining the physical pres-
ence requirement... is palpable."80
Despite the Court's protestations to the contrary, its Quill decision
harks back to the tax immunity rule, although without its reliance on
the direct-indirect dichotomy. Under the new tax immunity rule of
Quill there exists a "discrete realm of commercial activity that is free
from interstate taxation."81 This discrete realm is defined by a physi-
cal presence test which is unaffected by commercial activity purpose-
fully directed at exploiting a retail market within the taxing state.
The state may provide something, but within this discrete realm it
may not ask return. Disconnected from economic realities, the test is
inconsistent with the philosophy of Complete Auto.
Beyond that, Quill for the first time establishes a separate and dis-
tinct nexus test for due process and commerce clause purposes. The
immediate effect of overturning the due process branch of Bellas Hess
while retaining its commerce clause branch is apparent. As the Quill
Court noted,
[No matter how we evaluate burdens that use taxes impose on interstate com-
merce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. Indeed, in re-
cent years Congress has considered legislation that would "overrule" the
Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to take action in this direction may, of
course, have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the
Due Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we
have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide
whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-
order concerns with the duty to collect use taxes. 8 2
Congress would have had the same freedom had the Court chosen
to overrule the commerce clause branch as well as the due process
clause branch of Bellas Hess. Perhaps it was simply the Court's incom-
patible desires to allow Congress to legislate, and simultaneously avoid
a judicial change in the taxation of the mail-order industry, which led
the Court to adopt a different nexus test for due process and com-
state. See text accompanying note 22 supra. For an analysis of the fourth prong,
see David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Quiet Revolution or
Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 TAx L. REv. 127, 162-63 (1982).
80. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1920 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 1914.
82. Id at 1916.
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merce clause purposes. Result oriented reasoning frequently has un-
foreseen and undesirable consequences. It seems unlikely Quill will
do much to improve the jurisprudence of this "impoverished
territory."8 3
Quill did, however, provide one ray of hope. Bellas Hess amply
demonstrates the immense confusion and uncertainty that have been
created by the Court's consistent failure to separate due process and
commerce clause restrains on state power to tax interstate commerce.
As the Quill Court acknowledged, the need for treating due process
and commerce clause limitations as separate and distinct rather than
intermingled ones has long been recognized.8 4 The Court's careful
separation of due process and commerce clause analysis in the Quill
opinion, its holding that due process constraints on state taxing power
are not subject to revision by Congress, and its adoption of different
nexus tests under each clause, suggest it might be more mindful of
that need in the future. Unfortunately, as will be seen below, within
three weeks of its Quill decision the Court in Allied-Signal forgot its
own admonition,8 5 and applied an inseparable blend of due process
and commerce clause conceptions in determining the scope of state
power to tax interstate commerce. Thus, the one ray of hope created
by Quill was promptly extinguished.
II. ALLIED SIGNAL AND THE UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT
Allied-Signal, Inc. was the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Cor-
poration, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Michigan. Bendix was engaged in four lines of business, including the
production of aerospace products, development and manufacturer of
which was conducted in New Jersey. It did business in all fifty states
and twenty-two foreign countries. In the late 1970's Bendix acquired a
20% stock interest in ASARCO Inc., a New Jersey corporation with its
principal place of business in New York, and a leading producer of
nonferrous metals. In 1981 Bendix sold its stock to ASARCO at a gain
of $211.5 million. New Jersey assessed a tax on a portion of that gain,
and Bendix successfully challenged the tax on constitutional grounds.
83. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265
(1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting). Within months of the Quill decision the question
arose whether its separate nexus tests for due process and commerce clause pur-
poses apply to all taxes or just to sales and use taxes. In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, No. 23886, 1993 WL 248641 (S.C., July 6, 1993). The South
Carolina Supreme Court indicated the physical presence test of Quill applied
only to sales and use taxes. Id at n.4. For a review of the issues in Geoffrey, see 54
STATE TAX REV. No. 39, 6-9 (C.C.H. Sept. 27, 1993).
84. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
85. The Quill Court stated: "although we have not always been precise in distin-
guishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are
analytically distinct." Id at 1909.
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Unlike the Quill Corporation, Bendix clearly had a substantial
presence in the taxing state and could not claim it was beyond New
Jersey's power to tax under the nexus test of either the due process or
the commerce clause. Instead, Bendix claimed that while its connec-
tion with New Jersey was sufficient to support some tax, it did not
support a tax on gain realized from sale of the ASARCO stock because
the stock had no connection with its New Jersey activities. In short,
while the Quill case involved the question of whether a state had
power to tax, Allied-Signal focused on what the state could tax. As
put by the Allied-Signal Court: "The constitutional question in a case
such as Quill Corp. is whether the State has the authority to tax the
corporation at all. The present inquiry, by contrast, focuses on the
guidelines necessary to circumscribe the reach of the State's legitimate
power to tax."8 6
A. Apportionment and the Unitary Business Principle
Determining the scope of a state's power to tax interstate com-
merce usually poses a far more difficult question than determining
whether the power of taxation exists. For example, if a corporation
conducts an interstate business and has property or personnel in all
fifty states it is clear all have power to tax. But, if the corporation
realized net income of $1 million in a given year, how should one de-
termine the portion of that income taxable by each state? Apportion-
ment by formula and the unitary business concept have traditionally
been used to answer this question. As applied to an income tax8 7 this
means that income produced by a unitary business is taxable by all
states in which the business is conducted. Furthermore, no state need
establish an actual connection between the taxpayer's in-state activi-
ties and a specific portion of the unitary income which it taxes. In-
stead, the state may apply a formula based on in-state sales, property
or payroll compared to total sales, property or payroll, to determine
the portion of income which is deemed to be attributable to in-state
activities and therefore subject to tax. For example, if state A em-
ploys a single factor apportionment formula based on property, and
40% of the taxpayer's total property used in the unitary business is
located within state A, then state A may tax 40% of the income gener-
ated by the taxpayer's unitary business partly conducted within state
A.88
The efficacy of the unitary business principle as a justification for
apportionment by formula was cemented by Butler Brothers v. McCol-
gan.8 9 Butler Brothers made it practically impossible for a taxpayer to
86. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2251, 2258 (1992).
87. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
88. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
89. Butler Bros. v. McColgen, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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challenge formula apportionment by tracing income from a unitary
business to activity conducted outside the taxing state.9 0 Thus, in the
above example, the taxpayer could not successfully argue that
although 40% of its property was located in State A, unitary business
activities within State A accounted for less than 40% of unitary in-
come, and therefore State A's apportionment was excessive.
As far as income tax action is concerned, after Butler Brothers the
only practical means for challenging apportionment by formula is for
the taxpayer to demonstrate that the apportioned item of income was
not derived from a unitary business partly conducted within the tax-
ing state. The burden is a heavy one. First, the taxpayer must con-
vince the state court by "clear and cogent evidence" that
extraterritorial values are being taxed, that is, that the apportioned
income is derived from out-of-state activities unrelated to the unitary
business conducted within the state. Second, on review, the federal
courts will "if reasonably possible, defer to the judgment of state
courts in deciding whether a particular set of activities constitutes a
unitary business."91 If the taxpayer carries this burden of showing
that the apportioned item was derived from an activity unrelated to
the unitary business, then the item (such as gain realized by Bendix on
sale of the ASARCO stock) cannot be linked to the taxing state by the
unitary business principle. Unless some other link is demonstrated,
the tax will fall. On the other hand, if it is found that the gain was
derived from unitary business activities partly conducted within the
taxing state, the link is established and the tax will be upheld. Thus,
90. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 275, n.9 (1978), the Court suggested a
taxpayer may be able to overcome apportionment by formula if accounting evi-
dence demonstrated that the income allocated to a particular state by formula
was actually attributable to activities outside the state. However, in Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980), the Court rejected this proposition noting:
"As this Court has on several occasions recognized, a company's internal account-
ing techniques are not binding on a State for tax purposes." Citing Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). Quoting from its earlier decisions in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), and Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Exxon Court continued:
The 'linchpin of apportionability' for state income taxation of an inter-
state enterprise is the 'unitary-business principle.' If a company is a uni-
tary business, than a State may apply an apportionment formula to the
taxpayer's total income in order to obtain a 'rough approximation' of the
corporate income that is 'reasonably related to the activities conducted
within the taxing state.' In order to exclude certain income from the
apportionment formula, the company must prove that 'the income was
earned in the course of activities unrelated to... [the unitary business
conducted within the taxing state].' The Court looks to the 'underlying
economic realities of a unitary business,' and the income must derive
from 'unrelated business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business
enterprise.'
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207, 223-24 (1980)(citations omitted).
91. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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the scope of a state's power to tax income of a corporation carrying on
an interstate business within its borders depends upon the scope of the
unitary business concept. Income derived from all activities which
constitute part of the unitary business may be taxed on an apportioned
basis by each state in which unitary business activities take place.
The Allied-Signal Court began its analysis with a brief summary of
the development of the unitary business principle. That principle, the
Court stated,
is a recognition of two imperatives: the States' wide authority to devise formu-
lae for an accurate assessment of a corporation's intrastate value or income;
and the necessary limit on the States' authority to tax value or income which
cannot in fairness be attributed to the taxpayer's activities within the State. It
is this second component, the necessity for a limiting principle, that underlies
this case.9 2
New Jersey's power to tax Bendix on a portion of its gain from sale of
the ASARCO stock turned on whether that gain could "in fairness" be
partly attributed to Bendix's activities in New Jersey.
B. The Recent Precedents
A similar issue arose in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes,93 where Mobil, a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New York and doing business in Vermont, challenged
Vermont's power to tax a portion of dividend income realized by Mobil
on its holdings in subsidiaries and affiliated corporations. Announcing
that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxa-
tion is the unitary-business principle," the Court concluded that in or-
der for Mobil to succeed in its challenge, it must show "that the
income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of
petroleum products in [Vermont]." 9 4 So far as could be determined
from the record, Mobil's dividend income was derived from a single
unitary business carried on by Mobil and its related corporations.
Since the dividends had their source in this unitary business partly
conducted in Vermont, Vermont was entitled to tax an appropriate
portion of the dividend income. The Court cautioned,
[w]e do not mean to suggest that all dividend income received by corporations
92. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2259 (1992).
93. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
94. Id, at 439. Mobil argued that New York, its domicile, could tax all of its dividend
income, and to avoid multiple taxation no other state should be allowed to tax
any part of the same income. The Court noted that New York had not imposed
such a tax and the scope of its taxing power was not in issue. However, it broadly
hinted that New York's taxing power was limited to taxation on an apportioned
basis. The Court stated: "Taxation by apportionment and taxation by allocation
to a single situs are theoretically incommensurate, and if the latter method is
constitutionally preferred, a tax based on the former cannot be sustained. We
find no adequate justification, however, for such a preference." Id. at 444-45 (cita-
tions omitted).
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operating in interstate commerce is necessarily taxable in each State where
that corporation does business. Where the business activities of the dividend
payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing
State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, be-
cause there would be no underlying unitary business.
9 5
Two years after the Mobil decision, that possibility became a reality
in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,96 (the taxpayer in
this case was the same corporation as that in which Bendix purchased
stock which was later sold at a gain giving rise to the Allied-Signal
case); and F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Revenue Department.97
Like Mobil, ASARCO and Woolworth involved taxes on dividend in-
come received by nondomiciliary corporations doing business within
the taxing state. In contrast to Mobil, the Court concluded in each
case that the payor and payee of the dividends were not engaged in a
unitary business partly conducted within the taxing state, and there-
fore the payee was not subject to taxation by the nondomiciliary state
on its dividend income. In other words, since the taxpayer's activities
within the taxing state were unrelated to the business activities of the
dividend paying corporations, and the taxpayer was not domiciled
within the taxing state, there was no sufficient connection between
the taxing state and the dividends it sought to tax. As explained by
the Court in Allied-Signal, "[iun those cases the States sought to tax
unrelated business activity."98 Furthermore, the Allied-Signal Court
concluded that those cases were directly relevant to the Allied-Signal
issue since "for constitutional purposes capital gains should be treated
as no different from dividends."99
The announcement by the Mobil Court that the linchpin of appor-
tionment is the unitary business principle arguably carried a negative
implication. If dividend income was apportionable because the payor
and payee were engaged in a unitary business, and the unitary busi-
ness principle was the linchpin of apportionment, perhaps dividend
income could never be apportioned unless the payor and payee were
engaged in a unitary business.
ASARCO and Woolworth seemed to adopt this negative implication
of the Mobil dictum. In holding that dividends received by a nondomi-
ciliary corporation from subsidiaries with which it was not engaged in
a unitary business did not constitute unitary income subject to appor-
tionment, the ASARCO Court observed that in Mobil the state "pre-
vailed because it was clear that the corporations operated unitary
businesses with a continuous flow and interchange of common prod-
ucts. ASARCO has proved that these essential factors are wholly ab-
95. Id. at 441-42.
96. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
97. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
98. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2259 (1992).
99. Id. at 2259.
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sent in this case."100 Similarly, the Woolworth Court rested its
holding that a nondomiciliary state could not tax dividend income re-
ceived by a corporation doing business within the state, on the finding
that the payor and payee of the dividends were not engaged in a uni-
tary business. In her ASARCO dissent Justice O'Connor criticized the
Court for failing "to consider the possibility that ASARCO's invest-
ments were simply an interim use of long term funds accumulated for
ultimate use elsewhere in the business."101 Under this theory the in-
vestments would have been viewed as used in a unitary business partly
conducted in the taxing state, and income produced by the invest-
ments would have been subject to apportionment.
Mobil, ASARCO, and Woolworth indicated that dividend income is
subject to apportionment only if the payor and payee are engaged in a
unitary business. The principal factors in determining whether one
corporation is engaged in a unitary business with another corporation
in which it holds stock are: (1) functional integration; (2) centraliza-
tion of management; and (3) economies of scale. Subsequently, in
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board,1o2 the
Court applied this three factor test in holding that a corporation and
its foreign subsidiaries were engaged in a unitary business. Emphasiz-
ing that a unitary business may exist without a flow of goods between
the corporations, if there is a flow of value; the Court indicated that
the three factors may be shown by transactions not undertaken at
arm's length, a management role for the parent with respect to the
subsidiary's activities, and the fact both corporations were engaged in
the same line of business.
The central idea of the flow of value concept presumably is to in-
clude within the unitary business all activities which may benefit,
however indirectly, from the protection, opportunities, and benefits
provided by the taxing state. For example, if there had been a flow of
value from Bendix to ASARCO due to functional integration, central-
ized management or economies of scale achieved through joint opera-
tions, the corporations would have been engaged in a unitary business
and any benefit provided by New Jersey to the unitary business would
have automatically benefited both corporations. Gain realized by Ben-
dix on its sale of ASARCO stock would then have had its source in
business activities nurtured by New Jersey, and would have been sub-
ject to New Jersey taxation. On the other hand, if, as was found to be
the case in Allied-Signal, Bendix and ASARCO operated entirely in-
dependently of one another, benefits provided by New Jersey to Ben-
dix did not affect ASARCO. Therefore, ASARCO activities that
100. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 329-30, n.24 (1982)(em-
phasis added).
101. Id. at 353 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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enhanced the value of its stock could not be viewed as nurtured by
New Jersey. Since the unitary business principle provided no link be-
tween New Jersey and the enhanced value of the ASARCO stock,
New Jersey could not tax that value although it was realized by Ben-
dix, a corporation doing business within New Jersey.
C. The Allied-Signal Court's Analysis of the Precedents and
Determination of the Governing Principles
New Jersey stipulated that "Bendix and ASARCO were unrelated
business enterprises each of whose activities had nothing to do with
the other."103 This essentially precluded a finding that they were en-
gaged in a unitary business. Under the negative implication of Mobil,
dividends received by Bendix on the ASARCO stock could not be
taxed by New Jersey and neither could the gain realized on the sale of
the ASARCO stock. However, New Jersey contended that the unitary
business principle should be abandoned and all income of a nondomi-
ciliary corporation doing business within the state should be taxable
on an apportioned basis.104 Under this approach the due process
clause would require only that the taxpayer (not each taxed activity)
have a nexus with the taxing state. Multiple tax problems engendered
by virtue of a taxpayer having a nexus with several states and thus
being subject to tax in multiple states would be dealt with under the
commerce clause, primarily the apportionment prong of the Complete
Auto test. The Court rejected New Jersey's theory as inconsistent
"with the concept that the Constitution places limits on a State's
power to tax value earned outside of its borders."0
Actually New Jersey did not claim it could tax income earned
outside its borders free of constitutional constraints. Rather it dis-
agreed with the taxpayer over the nature of the constraints. The tax-
payer claimed New Jersey could not tax any part of the gain realized
on its sale of ASARCO stock. New Jersey claimed it could tax a por-
tion of the gain within the confines of the constitutional limitation of
apportionment.
New Jersey's claim that it could tax even if Bendix and ASARCO
were not engaged in a unitary business drew support from the treat-
ment of income derived from short-term investments of working capi-
tal used in a unitary business. The Court acknowledged these
investments produce unitary business income subject to apportion-
ment even if earned by a nondomiciliary corporation in an out-of-state
bank.106 Presumably, the theory is that working capital is necessary
103. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2263 (1992).
104. Id at 2261.
105. Id at 2261.
106. Id at 2263.
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to the operation of the business and income earned on short-term in-
vestments of working capital is therefore related to business opera-
tions.107 As Justice O'Connor argued forcefully in her dissenting
opinion in ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax Commission, "[t]he interim in-
vestment of retained earnings prior to their commitment to a major
corporate project.., merely recapitulates on a grander scale the short
term investment of working capital prior to its commitment to the
daily financial needs of the company."108 Therefore, income derived
from long-term investments, such as Bendix's purchase of ASARCO
stock, made to meet the long-term needs of a unitary business is re-
lated to the business in just the same way as is income derived from
short-term investments of working capital and should similarly be
viewed as unitary income.
Justice O'Connor's theory was very close to Idaho's proposal that
unitary business income should include income derived from invest-
ments undertaken "for purposes relating or contributing. to the tax-
payer's business."109 The ASARCO Court rejected the proposal
observing that since virtually any investment can in some sense be
said to serve the purposes of the corporation's business, "This defini-
tion of unitary business would destroy the concept."11o In effect, New
Jersey, like Justice O'Connor, found the working capital analogy com-
pelling. It agreed with the ASARCO Court that the logical implica-
tions of the working capital analogy destroyed the unitary business
concept, and concluded that the concept should be abandoned.
Rejecting New Jersey's proposal, the Court chose to retain the uni-
tary business principle but recognized an alternative route to appor-
tionment of income derived from long-term investments. It did so by
drawing a fine line between long-term investments which, like short-
term investments of working capital serve an operational function,
and those which merely serve a passive investment function. The for-
mer produce unitary business income subject to apportionment, while
the latter do not.
Like Justice O'Connor, the Allied-Signal Court concluded that
long-term investments should be treated consistently with short-term
investments of working capital.11 Consistent treatment means that
income from long-term investments serving a purpose similar to the
purpose served by working capital should be treated as unitary in-
come. In the Court's view, the critical factor in characterizing income
107. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331 (1982),
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The payor and payee of the interest income would not
be engaged in a unitary business, nor could it be claimed the out-of-state bank
benefited from New Jersey services.
108. Id. at 338, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 326.
110. Id. at 326.
111. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2266 (1992).
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derived from working capital as unitary income is not that working
capital serves a business purpose, but that it serves an operational
function; that is, working capital is needed in order for the business to
operate properly. Thus, income from long-term investments which
serve an operational function is, like income from working capital,
unitary income. And since stock investments which constitute an in-
terim use of capital accumulated for future operation of the unitary
business serve an operational function, any resulting income is unitary
income subject to apportionment.112 In the words of the Court, such
income is not "earned in the course of activities unrelated to [those
carried on in the taxing] State."113
Although Mobil, ASARCO, and Woolworth seemed to require a
unitary business relationship between the payor and payee of dividend
income as a prerequisite to apportionment, Allied-Signal tells us this
is not So.114 Under Allied-Signal dividend income received by
nondomicilary corporations is subject to apportionment if the payor
and the payee of the dividends are engaged in a unitary business (the
unitary business test), or the investment serves an operational rather
than an investment function for the payee (the operational function
test).
Despite the Court's claim that both tests were implicit in the ear-
lier decisions, it seems clear that Allied-Signal represents a significant
shift from ASARCO and Woolworth. A comparison of Justice
O'Connor's dissents in all three cases supports this proposition. In
ASARCO, which was decided in tandem with Woolworth, she charac-
terized the majority opinion as "groundless" and contrary to "common
sense and business reality."115 Although both long-term and short-
term investments could serve similar purposes, the majority had
treated these investments of working capital differently. In contrast,
Justice O'Connor was "largely in agreement with the Court's analy-
sis""16 in Allied-Signal, disagreeing not with the governing principles,
but their application. An examination of Justice O'Connor's dissent-
ing opinions in ASARCO, Woolworth, and Allied-Signal demonstrates
112. Id. at 2263.
113. Id.
114.
To be sure, the existence of a unitary relation between the payor and the
payee is one means of meeting the constitutional requirement. Thus, in
ASARCO and Woolworth we focused on the question whether there was
such a relation. We did not purport, however, to establish a general re-
quirement that there be a unitary relation between the payor and the
payee to justify apportionment, nor do we do so today.
Id at 2263.
115. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331, 335
(1982)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2264-65
(1992)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that she did not revise her view of the governing principles. Rather,
the governing principles changed.
D. Application of the Governing Principles
Since there was no serious contention that Bendix and ASARCO
were engaged in a unitary business, the case turned on whether Ben-
dix's purchase of ASARCO stock served an operational function. The
Supreme Court did not question the trial court's finding that Bendix
purchased the ASARCO stock in implementing a corporate strategy of
expansion through acquisition, and that the ASARCO stock was sold
to raise capital for an unsuccessful bid to acquire Martin Marietta, an
aerospace company whose business would have complemented Ben-
dix's aerospace business conducted in New Jersey. These facts led the
New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that purchase and sale of the
ASARCO stock was "an integral operational activity" growing out of
Bendix's "ingrained acquisition-divestiture policy"117 designed to ex-
pand and enhance its existing operations partly conducted within New
Jersey. Thus the tax was upheld. The United States Supreme Court
disagreed.
Apart from semantics we see no distinction between the "purpose" test we
rejected in ASARCO and the "ingrained acquisition-divestiture" policy ap-
proach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The hallmarks of an ac-
quisition which is a part of the taxpayer's unitary business continue to be
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale.... It is undisputed that none of these circumstances existed here.1 18
The opinion is confusing. In articulating the governing principles
the Court was very clear that income could be characterized as unitary
income under either the unitary business test or the operational func-
tion test. Yet, in applying the principles the Court said that long-term
investments undertaken to facilitate a corporate acquisition strategy
do not serve an operational function if they take the form of stock
holdings in a corporation not engaged in a unitary business with the
taxpayer. This interpretation is buttressed by the Court's statement
that: "Even if we were to assume that Martin Marietta, once acquired,
would have been operated as part of Bendix's unitary business, that
reveals little about whether ASARCO was run as part of Bendix's uni-
tary business."119 In other words, because Bendix and ASARCO were
not engaged in a unitary business, New Jersey could not apportion
Bendix's gain on the ASARCO stock; despite the Court's earlier flat
statement that the unitary business test was not the exclusive road to
apportionment.
In addition to pointing to the fact Bendix and ASARCO were not
117. Id. at 2257, 2261.
118. Id. at 2264 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 2264.
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engaged in a unitary business, the Court observed that the ASARCO
stock, which was held for about two years, did not amount to a short-
term investment of working capital. While this is correct, the gov-
erning principles again articulated by the Court indicate it should not
have been fatal to characterizing the investment as serving an opera-
tional function. As Justice O'Connor observed in dissent: "Any dis-
tinction between short-term and long-term investments cannot be of
constitutional dimension." 120 The Court provided no alternative ex-
planation as to why Bendix's investment in ASARCO stock did not
serve an operational function, or why it should be treated differently
than a short-term investment of working capital.
In short, the two reasons provided by the Court for its conclusion
that the purchase and sale of ASARCO stock did not meet the opera-
tional function test which it set out, do nothing to inform one of the
contents of that test. Indeed, the same reasons would have supported
a decision favorable to the taxpayer under the pre-Allied-Signal view
that for investment income to be unitary income subject to apportion-
ment, either the payor and payee must be engaged in a unitary busi-
ness or the investment income must be derived from the short-term
investment of Working capital. One might conclude the Allied-Signal
Court revised the governing principles but in applying them failed to
revise its analysis. This leaves in doubt the practical effect of the oper-
ational function test. It may be that the Court will apply it in a fash-
ion so stilted as to rob it of any practical significance.
The Court did suggest that defining capital transactions which
serve an operational function in a way that corresponds to the defini-
tion of business income under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA) "may be quite compatible with the unitary
business principle."121 UDITPA defines business income as "income
arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the tax-
payer's trade or business and includes income from tangible and intan-
gible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the
property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or
business operations."122 It undoubtedly is true that an activity inte-
gral to the taxpayer's New Jersey business would serve an operational
function. However, all precedent indicates that for New Jersey's tax-
ing power to be constitutionally curbed, it must be reaching activities
that "have nothing to do with" the taxpayer's New Jersey business. 123
Surely, an activity may not be integral to, but still have something to
do with, the New Jersey business. Thus, while UDITPA is compatible
with the prior decisions, it cannot properly be viewed as marking the
120. Id at 2266 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. I& at 2262.
122. UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAx PuRPOsEs ACT § 1(a), 7 U.L.A. 336 (1985).
123. See text accompanying notes 93 and 96 supra.
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outer boundaries of the state's power to tax. In a word, the UDITPA
rule is underinclusive. It cannot plausibly be viewed as including all
income that can "in fairness be attributed to the taxpayer's activities
within the [taxing] State."124
The Court also pointed'2 5 to its earlier decisions in Container Cor-
poration of America v. Franchise Tax Board,126 and Corn Products Re-
fining Co. v. Commissioner,127 for guidance in distinguishing capital
transactions which serve an investment function from those which
serve an operational function.128 Container (like Mobil) held that a
parent corporation doing business in the taxing state and its foreign
subsidiaries were engaged in a unitary business. In reaching this con-
clusion the Court noted that one factor which may be taken into ac-
count is whether there was a flow of value from the parent to its
subsidiaries. Because the parent corporation made loans to its subsidi-
aries on terms more favorable than would have been accepted in an
arm's length transaction, such a flow of value was obvious.129 And,
citing Corn Products, the Court stated that "capital transactions can
serve either an investment function or an operational function."13 0
Unfortunately Container provides no guidance for resolving the is-
sue at hand. No party claimed that Bendix had made an investment
which resulted in a flow of value from itself to ASARCO. If it had, as
Container makes clear, such a flow of value would have been some
evidence that Bendix and ASARCO were engaged in a unitary busi-
ness. But that issue was foreclosed by the stipulated facts and
Container suggests nothing concerning whether the Bendix purchase
of ASARCO stock served an operational function in Bendix's aero-
space business.
Corn Products, at first blush, might seem to provide a more power-
ful analogy. It involved whether a company engaged in theobusiness of
converting corn into syrup and other corn products realized capital
gain or ordinary income under the Internal Reventie Code when it
sold corn futures. Although a literal application of the statute indi-
cated that corn futures were capital assets, the Court noted that the
futures were purchased to assure a ready supply of corn at a predict-
able price and that Congress intended "that profits and losses arising
from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary
income or loss rather than capital gain or loss."'1 31 Since maintaining a
supply of corn was part of the everyday operation of the business, gain
124. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2259 (1992).
125. Id at 2264.
126. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
127. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
128. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2264 (1992).
129. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180, n.19 (1983).
130. Id
131. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52.
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or loss on corn futures transactions was held to be ordinary rather
than capital.132
The original Corn Products doctrine, which has been substantially
revised,133 had much in common with the UDITPA rule discussed
above.' 34 Critical to each is whether a given activity is integral to the
taxpayer's ordinary business activity. For the reasons given above in
connection with the UDITPA rule, Corn Products may be useful in
determining what activities are clearly within the scope of a state's
taxing power, but the outer boundaries remain elusive.
While Allied-Signal says unitary income may include investment
income other than that received from a payor engaged in a unitary
business with the payee, and that received from short-term invest-
ments of working capital; the extent to which this is so is unclear.
Presumably, transactions which are integral to a business conducted
within a state generate income subject to apportionment. But that test
cannot, consistently with precedent, define all that a state may tax.
E. The Dissent
Criticizing the majority for leaving "operational function" largely
undefined,135 Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that any investment
intended to benefit business activities conducted within the taxing
state should be viewed as serving an operational function. Under this
approach the operational function test is essentially identical to the
business purpose test urged by Idaho and rejected by the Court in
ASARCO, and is broader than the UDITPA/Corn Products ordinary
business activity test. In Justice O'Connor's view, Bendix's acquisition
of ASARCO stock was functionally related to its New Jersey business
activities because it was intended to benefit those activities by accumu-
lating capital for their future expansion.
This theory is less comprehensive than that urged by New Jersey
which would have viewed all income earned by a nondomiciliary cor-
132. The Corn Products doctrine soon expanded beyond the recurring, everyday trans-
actions from which it sprang. Most of the litigated cases in which it was applied
involved taxpayers who claimed an ordinary loss on stock which had been
purchased for a business purpose such as assuring a source of supply, or cultivat-
ing the goodwill of a customer. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303
F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962); FS Servs., Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984).
133. In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988), the Court reexam-
ined Corn Products and concluded that the decision was not based on the notion
corn futures transactions were integral to the taxpayer's business operation, but
on the fact corn futures were a substitute for inventory. The Corn Products doc-
trine was limited to transactions integral to the taxpayer's inventory purchase
system.
134. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
135. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2266
(1992)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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poration as subject to apportionment. Justice O'Connor agreed with
the majority that New Jersey's theory went too far.136
Justice O'Connor avoided the analytical pitfalls of the majority
and, as she had done earlier in ASARCO, correctly pointed out that the
distinction between income earned from short-term investments of
working capital and income earned from long-term investments which
serve business needs is not a principled one. Unfortunately, she failed
to provide a persuasive explanation as to why her theory was superior
to New Jersey's in answering the fundamental question: Did the tax-
ing state give anything for which it can ask return? She stated:
I agree with the Court that we cannot adopt New Jersey's suggestion that the
unitary business principle be replaced by a rule allowing a State to tax a pro-
portionate share of all the income generated by any corporation doing busi-
ness there. Were we to adopt a rule allowing taxation to depend upon
corporate identity alone, as New Jersey suggests, the entire Due Process in-
quiry would become fictional, as the identities of corporations would fracture
in a corporate shell game to avoid taxation. Under New Jersey's theory, for
example, petitioner could avoid having its ASARCO investment taxed in New
Jersey simply by establishing a separate subsidiary to hold those earnings
outside New Jersey. A constitutional principle meant to insure that States tax
only business activities they can reasonably claim to have helped support
should depend on something more than manipulations of corporate
structure.
1 3 7
The complete answer to Justice O'Connor's concern is that under
New Jersey's theory, corporate presence within the state could serve
as a sufficient but not a necessary condition for proportionate taxation
of all the corporation's income. Thus, had Bendix formed a New York
holding company to hold the ASARCO investment and all other facts
remained the same, gain realized on the investment could still be
reached by New Jersey on the theory the investment benefited a uni-
tary business partly conducted within New Jersey.
Essentially, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's statement
that: "in the case of a tax on an activity, there must be a connection to
the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the actor the State
seeks to tax."1 38 She properly criticized the Court for its analytical
failure but in the end disagreed only on whether the necessary con-
nection was established in this case, not on whether it should be re-
quired. The question remains whether there are good reasons for
requiring such a connection.
136. She stated: "It is not just that the ASARCO investment was made to benefit Ben-
dix as a corporate entity. As the Court points out, any investment a corporation
makes is intended to benefit the corporation in general. The proper question is
rather: Was the income New Jersey seeks to tax intended to be used to benefit a
unitary business of which Bendix's New Jersey operations were a part?" Id. at
2266 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2265 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
138. Id. at 2258.
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III. SHOULD THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT APPLY
SEPARATELY TO EACH TAXED ACTIVITY?
The Quill Court, quoting Justice Rutledge, stated that: "'Due pro-
cess' and 'commerce clause' conceptions are not always sharply separa-
ble in dealing with these problems.... And, although the two notions
cannot always be separated, clarity of consideration and of decision
would be promoted if the two issues are approached.., at least tenta-
tively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones."13 9
With this admonition in mind, the question will be considered first
from the standpoint of the due process clause, then from that of the
commerce clause.
A. The Due Process Clause Nexus Requirement
The central concern of due process is assuring the fundamental
fairness of government activity.140 Just as it would be fundamentally
unfair and violative of due process to impose a tax on one who has no
connection with the taxing state, because no benefit has been received
from the state; so it may be fundamentally unfair to tax an activity
engaged in by one who has a connection with the taxing state, but who
has received no benefit in connection with the taxed activity. This is
the underlying due process rationale of the Allied-Signal holding that
a nondomiciliary state must have a connection with the taxed activity,
not merely with the taxpayer. However, as Mobil, ASARCO, Wool-
worth, Container Corporation, and Allied-Signal demonstrate, deter-
mining whether an activity has benefited from state services is no easy
matter. The question becomes whether a state may avoid this difficult
factual determination by engaging in a presumption that some part of
all income earned by a taxpayer present within the state and engaged
in interstate business (an interstate taxpayer), is derived from activi-
ties that have benefited from state services. If such a presumption is
fundamentally fair to the taxpayer, then all income producing activi-
ties may be automatically linked through the presumption to any state
in which the taxpayer is present. If the presumption is unfair, a link
must be demonstrated with respect to each taxed activity. Although
Allied-Signal adopted the latter approach, it provided no explanation
for why fair treatment requires such an approach. In considering the
fairness issue, insight may be gained from a comparison of resident
and nonresident taxpayers.
In the case of a resident taxpayer due process constraints on the
state's power to tax are minimal.141 This may be because all activities
139. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
140. Id at 1913.
141. See Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937)(New York resident may be taxed by New
York on rental income from land located in New Jersey. "Enjoyment of the priv-
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of one who is domiciled within a state are deemed to benefit from state
services; or because a resident, as a citizen of the state in which he
resides, is an actual or potential beneficiary of all state services and
therefore has a general duty to contribute to the support of govern-
ment. Thus, the Court has stated that so far as due process is con-
cerned the nature and measure of taxes imposed on a resident
(including a corporation domiciled within the state), "is largely a polit-
ical matter."142 In this context the nexus requirement may be viewed
as only running to the taxpayer. Since residency provides a nexus
with the taxpayer, all activities are subject to tax. Alternatively, resi-
dency may be viewed as automatically establishing a nexus with all
activities of a resident taxpayer. The choice of theory has no practical
significance. The salient point is that due process does not require the
state to demonstrate a connection with each taxed activity of a
resident.
A state may, of course, also tax nonresidents with whom it has a
sufficient nexus.143 Since in the case of nonresidents, nexus is based
on some activity (including the ownership of property) within the
state, it naturally follows that the scope of the taxing power as applied
to nonresidents will be more limited than as applied to residents.144
Within the context of a nonresident taxpayer not engaged in interstate
commerce (a nonresident intrastate taxpayer) it is plain that the due
process nexus requirement should run to the particular activity sub-
ject to tax. For example, it would be arbitrary to hold that a nonresi-
ileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government."
Id- at 313).
142. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954). The power to tax a resident
is not exclusively a political matter, however; as is demonstrated by the due pro-
cess constraint which prohibits a state from taxing a resident on real property
located outside the state. See Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935); Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929). Some commentators believe this con-
straint should be abandoned as inconsistent with the general theory which views
the power to tax residents as limited only by political considerations. See Boris I.
Bittker, Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947); HEL-
LERSTEIN, supra note 25, at 830.
143. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920)(State may tax income earned by a nonresi-
dent from property located within the state.).
144. In Shaffer, the Court emphasized that the taxing state "assumed no power to tax
non-residents with respect to income" derived from property or business beyond
the borders of the State." Id at 53. Shaffer, together with Cohn v. Graves, 300
U.S. 308 (1937), means residents are taxable on all income regardless of where its
source is located, while nonresidents are taxable only on income derived from
sources within the taxing state. See also International Harvester Co. v. Wiscon-
sin, 322 U.S. 435, 441 (1944)("A state may tax such part of the income of a non-
resident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to events
or transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation and which
are within the protection of the state and entitled to the numerous other benefits
which it confers.")
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dent taxpayer owning property within the taxing state and subject to
tax on income derived from such property may also be taxed on all
income regardless of its source. While the state provided benefits with
respect to the ownership of property located within its borders, that
does not imply that it also provided benefits with respect to income
from sources outside the state. Since the taxpayer is not engaged in an
interstate enterprise of which the in-state activity is arguably a part,
the state cannot claim that it is difficult to determine whether its serv-
ices were beneficial to the taxpayer's activities in another state. Thus,
with respect to an intrastate taxpayer there is no need and certainly
no basis for presuming that the taxpayer's out-of-state activities were
benefited by state services.
At least so far as intrastate taxpayers are concerned, it makes sense
to distinguish between residents and nonresidents and to require the
state to demonstrate a connection with each taxed activity of a nonres-
ident even though no such requirement applies to residents. This dis-
tinction comports with the fundamental fairness purpose underlying
the due process clause because it is clear the state provided benefits to
the nonresident intrastate taxpayer only with respect to the in-state
activity, while the same cannot be said of the resident taxpayer.
The question arises whether due process analysis should be differ-
ent in the case of a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce. The
purpose of the due process clause remains the same: to prohibit funda-
mentally unfair taxation by limiting the taxing power to situations in
which the state has given something for which it can ask return. The
theories that support taxation of all income realized by resident intra-
state taxpayers seem equally applicable to resident interstate taxpay-
ers, including corporate taxpayers domiciled within the taxing state.
There is nothing to suggest those theories are somehow undermined
by a resident taxpayer engaging in interstate commerce. Although the
states traditionally have not done so, there is no apparent due process
obstacle to a domiciliary state taxing all income earned by resident
interstate taxpayers whether derived from interstate operations or
any other source.145
Similarly, the theory that supports limiting taxation of nonresident
intrastate taxpayers to income derived from activities conducted
within the state, might be thought to apply equally to nonresident in-
terstate taxpayers. This thought (although not articulated) seems to
underlie the requirement of Allied-Signal and its forerunners that a
connection exist between a nondomiciliary state and each activity it
seeks to tax. Just as a state can tax a nonresident intrastate taxpayer
on income derived from sources within the state but not an income
145. See PAuL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
470.
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from other sources; so New Jersey could tax Allied-Signal on income
derived from activities demonstrably connected with New Jersey but
not an income derived from other activities. Thus, for purposes of due
process analysis, current decisional law supports no distinction be-
tween taxpayers depending upon whether they are engaged in inter-
state commerce. Residents are taxable on all income. Nonresidents
are taxable only on income derived from activities demonstrably con-
nected with the taxing state.146 Before evaluating the validity of this
approach, it will be useful to consider the impact of the commerce
clause.
B. The Commerce Clause Nexus Requirement
While the due process clause is aimed at assuring fundamentally
fair treatment of the taxpayer, the commerce clause stands on a differ-
ent footing. As the Quill Court stated: "In contrast, [to the due pro-
cess clause] the Commerce Clause, and its nexus requirement, are
informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regula-
tion on the national economy."147 "Structural concerns" means con-
cerns about state taxes or regulations which unduly burden interstate
commerce, 148 as for example, by exposing it to a risk of multiple taxa-
tion.149 The Allied-Signal holding that the state must demonstrate a
connection with each taxed activity was grounded on both the due pro-
cess and commerce clauses. The commerce clause question is whether
there is a principled basis for requiring that the state have a demon-
strable connection with each taxed activity of a nonresident interstate
taxpayer, as opposed to merely a connection with the taxpayer.
The risk of multiple taxation, which the Court properly identified
as the concrete commerce clause concern, does not support such a re-
quirement. This is because requiring a connection with the taxed ac-
tivity is an ineffective method for dealing with multiple taxation.
Since more than one state will frequently have such a connection, the
multiple tax problem will persist despite the existence of a demonstra-
146. In the case of nonresidents engaged in an interstate business partly conducted
within the taxing state, the connection may be established by the unitary business
principle. See supra text following note 84.
147. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913 (1992).
148. Id.
149. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
The reason the Commerce Clause includes this limit [requiring a connec-
tion between the state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax] is self-evident: in a union of 50 states, to permit each state to tax
activities outside its borders would have drastic consequences for the na-
tional economy, as businesses could be subjected to severe multiple
taxation.
Id. at 2258.
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ble nexus between the state and the taxed activity. Thus, at most, re-
quiring that there be such a nexus avoids multiple taxation only in the
rare case of an activity engaged in by an interstate taxpayer which
plausibly can be viewed as connected with only one state. Further-
more, as the chain of decisions culminating in Allied-Signal make
clear, defining the scope of "connected" activities is a difficult and un-
certain task. The cost of such a definition clearly outweighs any occa-
sional benefit which might be achieved by way of preventing multiple
taxation in the rare case of an activity plausibly connected with only
one state. To put the matter bluntly, requiring a demonstrable con-
nection between the state and the taxed activity in order to reduce the
risk of multiple taxation makes no sense. This requirement is an ut-
terly ineffective means of achieving that goal.
On the other hand, apportionment by formula holds the potential
for a complete solution to the multiple taxation problem. If every
state were permitted to tax a part of every item of income accruing to
an interstate taxpayer doing business within its borders, no state
should be permitted to tax any item of income in its entirety.'5 0 As
the Mobil Court stated concerning proper application of the commerce
clause: "Taxation by apportionment and taxation by allocation to a
single situs are theoretically incommensurate."1 5 ' Furthermore, if the
apportionment requirement were rigorously applied, it would deal ef-
fectively with the risk of multiple taxation and thus meet the struc-
tural concerns of the commerce clause. For example, if each state
were required to use the same apportionment formula, multiple taxa-
tion would be drastically reduced if not eliminated. While there may
be no sound basis for the Court imposing a single formula, it certainly
could do much to reduce the diversity of formulas currently used. 52
If necessary, Congress could impose a single formula and provide for
uniform methods of application.
150. Although there is no clear holding on the issue, prominent commentators have
suggested that income derived from interstate activities may be taxed in full by
the domiciliary state and on an apportioned basis by nondomiciliary states in
which the activities are conducted without offending the commerce clause.
Others disagree. See infra note 152. The proposition conflicts with the central
purpose of the commerce clause which is to prevent multiple or otherwise bur-
densome taxation of interstate commerce, see Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div.
of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992), and seems doubtful. It may, however,
explain why New-Jersey took the position in Allied-Signal that as a nondomicil-
iary state it could tax all income on an apportioned basis, and the domiciliary
state could tax without apportionment all income derived from intangibles. Re-
spondent's Brief on Reargument at 38-39, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992). This, of course, significantly undercut New
Jersey's theory.
151. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1980).
152. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1978)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and (Powell, J., dissenting).
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A number of advantages would attend an approach that allowed
any state in which an interstate taxpayer does business to tax all of the
taxpayer's income on an apportioned basis. First, unlike the Allied-
Signal holding that the nexus requirement of the commerce clause
requires a demonstrable connection with each taxed activity, this ap-
proach furthers the underlying purpose of the commerce clause to
prevent multiple taxation. This advantage should not be lightly dis-
missed in an area of law which is widely recognized as intellectually
impoverished.53 Second, it would eliminate the need for attenuated
distinctions between those activities which are demonstrably con-
nected with the taxing state, and those which are not. Third, since no
tax significance would attach to where an interstate taxpayer is domi-
ciled, it would discourage unhealthy competition among the states
aimed at attracting corporate headquarters through tax breaks.
Fourth, since the domiciliary state, like nondomiciliary states, could
tax all income but only on an apportioned basis, the Court would not
have to decide which state has the best claim to tax when two or more
states claim domiciliary status.154 Fifth, it would make clear that the
domiciliary state cannot tax in full any item of income realized by an
interstate taxpayer, since nondomiciliary states could tax the same in-
come on an apportioned basis.155 Finally, if the competing claims of
states to tax an item were resolved under the apportionment require-
ment of the commerce clause, rather than the nexus requirements of
153. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
265 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting); David F. Shores, State Taxation of Gross Re-
ceipts and the Negative Commerce Clause, 54 Mo. L. REV. 555, n.1 (1989).
154. Under Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936), a corporation may have a
commercial domicile (if the corporation has "made that the actual seat of its cor-
porate government." Id. at 212) different from its legal domicile which is the
state of incorporation. Under the proposed approach domiciliary status would
become meaningless and irrelevant to determining the scope of a state's power to
tax income realized by an interstate taxpayer. Instead, the scope of taxation, that
is, the portion of income subject to tax, would depend on actual contacts such as
property, sales or employees within the taxing state compared to total property,
sales or employees.
155. Despite the Court's often repeated view that the commerce clause is aimed at
preventing multiple taxation, (see Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992), for the latest version) leading commentators have
disagreed on whether a domiciliary state has power to tax all income realized by
an interstate taxpayer, while nondomiciliary states may tax the same income on
an apportioned basis. Cf., PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION 470 (Cum. Supp. 1992). GEORGE T. ALTMAN & FRANK M.
KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 30-31 (2d ed. 1950); with
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 306-08 (1983). That the effectiveness
of the commerce clause in dealing with such an obvious multiple tax problem is a
matter of controversy, provides powerful testimony to the failure of the Court's
commerce clause jurisprudence in the area of state taxation of interstate
commerce.
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both the due process and commerce clauses, any judicial solution to
the multiple tax problem would be subject to revision by Congress.
In contrast, since Allied-Signal relied on the due process clause as
well as the commerce clause, it would presumably be unconstitutional
for Congress to adopt an apportionment formula and provide for its
application to all income realized by a nonresident interstate taxpayer
doing business within a state.1 56 In view of the immense complexity of
apportionment issues such a restraint on legislative action is
inappropriate.
C. The Relationship of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses in the
Context of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
But what of the due process clause? Can the due process notion
that fundamental fairness requires a demonstrable connection be-
tween the state and the taxed activity of a nonresident taxpayer
(whether or not engaged in interstate commerce), be reconciled with
the proposed commerce clause notion that any connection between
the state and an interstate taxpayer will do? The answer is no. Cur-
rent due process requirements preclude the proposed commerce
clause analysis.
However, two reasons suggest due process analysis should be af-
fected by whether the taxpayer is engaged in interstate commerce.
First, as the decisional law makes clear, linking specific income with
specific activities undertaken by an interstate taxpayer is a task of ex-
traordinary difficulty. The extent to which state efforts to do so have
divided the Court suggests the process is likely to be speculative and
the results less than satisfying. In light of this problem states ought to
be allowed to presume all activities carried on by an interstate tax-
payer doing business within the state are connected with the state, un-
less it is very clear such a presumption would impose a fundamentally
unfair burden on the taxpayer. Second, as has already been pointed
out,15 7 if all states having contact with an interstate taxpayer could tax
all income on an apportioned basis, a necessary corollary would be
that no state could tax on an unapportioned basis. In other words,
partial taxation by all would mean full taxation by none. In contrast,
since the apportionment requirement of the commerce clause does not
apply to intrastate taxpayers, no constitutional principle would man-
date apportionment by all states having contact with the intrastate
taxpayer. Thus, all states having sufficient contact with an intrastate
taxpayer could tax all income in full. This raises questions of funda-
mental fairness which would not arise with respect to an interstate
taxpayer.
156. See supra text accompanying note 46.
157. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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In light of these reasons, the traditional due process requirement
that a nondomiciliary state have a connection with each taxed activity
is more difficult to defend in the case of an interstate taxpayer than in
the case of an intrastate taxpayer. Both the states' need for avoiding
such a requirement and the practical effect of abolishing it are dramat-
ically affected by whether the taxpayer is engaged in interstate activi-
ties. It is difficult to see how allowing all states having sufficient
contact with an interstate taxpayer to tax all income on an appor-
tioned basis can plausibly be viewed as fundamentally unfair. Treat-
ing interstate and intrastate taxpayers identically for purposes of due
process analysis suggests apportionment is irrelevant to determining
whether a tax on an activity touching more than one state is funda-
mentally unfair. Such an approach, it seems, makes no sense.
In light of these considerations, it is proposed that once a nexus is
established between a state and an interstate taxpayer, all due process
requirements respecting what the state may tax be satisfied. This
would, of course, sharply curtail current due process limitations on
state taxation of interstate commerce. It would simply ask whether
the state has given the interstate taxpayer anything for which it can
ask return. If the answer is yes, due process analysis would end and
the state would have power to tax the taxpayer's entire net income
subject to commerce clause restrains. Commerce clause analysis
would begin and multiple taxation would be dealt with under the ap-
portionment prong of the Complete Auto test. The useless second
prong of the due process test (the rational relationship requirement)
set out in Moorman158 would be jettisoned. The Court never has
made clear why apportionment formulas designed to meet commerce
clause concerns should be evaluated under the due process clause.159
158. See supra text accompanying note 15, for a description of the two prong test. All
due process requirements are arguably useless as applied to an interstate tax-
payer because they duplicate commerce clause requirements. See note 23 supra.
However, the first prong of the Moorman test (minimal contact requirement)
may serve a useful purpose by denying Congress power to permit taxation of in-
terstate commerce without regard to contact. To say the second prong is useless
is too mild. As explained in note 157 infra, it has had a harmful effect on com-
merce clause jurisprudence.
159. Evaluating apportionment formulas under the due process clause has been the
source of much mischief. As one would expect in light of the due process concern
for fundamental fairness, the Court has been extremely generous to the states.
For example, in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978), the Court
declared that a formula would be upheld unless the taxpayer demonstrated
through "clear and cogent evidence" that the income attributed to the taxing
state was "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted... in that
State." This standard makes sense if the goal is simply to assure fundamental
fairness. It does not make sense if apportionment is properly viewed as a com-
merce clause requirement aimed at preventing the risk of multiple taxation. See
Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the proposed approach would reduce
the role of the due process clause as a limitation on state taxation of interstate
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The fact is multiple taxation of interstate commerce is a commerce
clause problem and it ought to be addressed as such. It is hard to im-
agine a more appropriate subject for federal legislation, or a less ap-
propriate subject for judicial solution. Deciding which of the fifty
states having a connection with an interstate taxpayer has the highest
and best claim to taxation of a particular item of income is mainly a
political, not a legal issue. No fundamental principle of constitutional
law is at stake or suggests a solution. Perhaps investment income
should be taxed exclusively by the state of commercial domicile, per-
haps by the state of legal domicile, or perhaps all states contributing to
the success and value of the taxpayer should be able to tax. While
arguments can be made to support each option, no option can persua-
sively be viewed as fundamentally unfair to the taxpayer so long as
any state seeking to tax can do so only on an apportioned basis. What
should be clear, but is not under the doctrinal hodge-podge of current
decisional law, is that if one or more states can tax income on an
apportioned basis, no state should have power to tax without appor-
tionment. Thus, the concern for preventing multiple taxation of inter-
state commerce expressed by the Court in Allied-Signal, and the
structural policies recognized by the Quill Court as animating the
Commerce clause, would be advanced rather than retarded by the pro-
posed approach. Furthermore, a general shift in emphasis from the
due process to the commerce clause with the concomitant enhance-
ment of Congressional authority over state taxation of interstate com-
merce is entirely consistent with the Quill decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
A proper separation of due process from commerce clause concerns
in dealing with state taxation of interstate commerce not only would
contribute to clarity of analysis but would avoid infusing due process
with commerce clause values springing from the doctrine of undue
burdens. Traditionally, the due process clause has been overempha-
sized as a limitation on state taxation of interstate commerce. The re-
sults have not been good. Most importantly, greater reliance on the
commerce clause would assure that judicial decisions designed to safe-
guard commerce clause values are subject to legislative review and re-
vision. In a very real sense a shift in emphasis from the due process
clause to the commerce clause would deconstitutionalize federal limi-
tations on state taxation of interstate commerce. While the negative
commerce clause doctrine has been controversial, not even its strong-
est proponents would claim that the commerce clause vests the
commerce, it would likely lead to elevated scrutiny under the commerce clause.
This would be entirely appropriate and desirable since judicial error would be
subject to legislative correction.
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Supreme Court with power to regulate state taxation of interstate
commerce, free of Congressional supervision. Yet, this is precisely the
result when commerce clause values are fed into the due process
clause.
